

Welcome to the webinar

# How to optimize your medical device risk management with ISO 14971


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Navin Dewagan & Lola Furlong



# Today's agenda

- 01 Why ISO 14971 matters to the FDA
- 02 Aligning your strategies
- 03 Optimizing the ISO 14971 lifecycle
- 04 Continuous ISO 14971 compliance with Qualio
- 05 Q&A



# Today's hosts



**Navin Dewagan**  
CEO  
Digital Health Solutions



**Lola Furlong**  
Senior Quality Success Manager  
Qualio

# Quick poll



# Quick poll



# What is today about?

Moving beyond  
checkbox risk  
management

Building a risk management  
file that withstands audits  
and inspections

Making ISO 14971  
a practical  
lifecycle risk  
management tool

Designing great medical  
device products that serve  
patients and clinical users

# 1. Why ISO 14971 matters to the FDA

# Why ISO 14971 is critical for FDA-regulated devices

- Foundation for demonstrating safety and effectiveness
  - Supports FDA's reasonable assurance determination
- Evaluated through design controls and the DHF (*or MDF after February 2026!*)
  - Risk management is assessed via design inputs, V&V and labeling
- Weak risk management creates regulatory and patient risk
  - Drives FDA findings, additional information requests and delays
  - Leads to post-market issues, complaints and recalls

**Key message:** *FDA does not approve risk files. FDA evaluates whether your risk management supports safe and effective device design.*

## 2. Aligning your strategies



# Risk management: strategic tool, not constraint!

- Regulatory strategy sets the rules of the game
  - Intended use, classification, submission type and evidence expectations
- Risk management operationalizes regulatory strategy
  - Identifies which risks must be controlled, justified or avoided
  - Informs design choices, development scope and timelines
- Product roadmap is built on risk-informed decisions
  - What features to include or defer
  - Which markets and indications to pursue first
  - How to balance speed, evidence and safety

**Key message:** *Risk management executes regulatory strategy and guides product roadmap decisions*

# Example: SaMD/AI clinical decision support

- Regulatory strategy not clearly defined
  - Intended use written to appear non-device
  - CDS exemption assumed without risk-based justification
- Risk management misapplied
  - Clinical decision impact underestimated
  - Software and algorithm risks not fully characterized
- FDA outcome when CDS exemption does not apply
  - Product determined to be regulated SaMD
  - Risk management and design controls had to be rebuilt

**Key message:** *This is what happens when risk analysis is disconnected from intended use*




# Example: hardware device intended use expansion

- Regulatory change not fully assessed
  - Intended use expanded to new users or environments
  - Impact on safety assumptions not clearly evaluated
- Risk analysis misapplied
  - Use related hazards not re-identified
  - Severity and probability underestimated for new context
  - Usability and environment of use not fully addressed
- FDA outcome
  - Change determined to significantly affect safety or effectiveness
  - New 510(k) submission required

**Key message:** *Changes in intended use invalidate prior risk assumptions and require updated risk analysis to support FDA decisions*



# Regulatory pathway drives risk expectations



**Key message:** Your regulatory pathway determines how rigorous your risk analysis must be

# Top risk mistakes

1

## Inconsistent intended use across the DHF

*Intended use differs between risk files, design inputs, labeling and submissions*

2

## Risk analysis not grounded in actual use

*Template-driven hazards not tied to clinical workflow  
Severity and likelihood not justified in context of use*

3

## Weak linkage between risk controls and V&V

*Risk controls not traced to verification or validation evidence  
Effectiveness of controls not demonstrated*

4

## Postmarket data not feeding back into risk management


*Complaints, CAPAs and vigilance data not reflected in updated risk analysis*

**Key message:** Most FDA findings are driven by inconsistency and weak justification, not necessarily missing documents!

### 3. Optimizing the ISO 14971 lifecycle



# ISO 14971 lifecycle reviewed by FDA



**Key message:** *The FDA evaluates risk management across your entire device lifecycle, not as a one-time activity*

# Using hazard analysis for effective dFMEA

- Hazard analysis sets the safety context
  - Identifies hazards based on intended use and foreseeable misuse
  - Establishes initial severity based on potential patient harm
- Severity determination guides design focus
  - High severity hazards demand early attention
  - Helps engineers prioritize what must be designed out versus controlled
- dFMEA builds on hazard analysis
  - Failure modes are evaluated in the context of identified hazards
  - Severity ratings should align with patient impact, not component failure
- Risk controls flow from hazard severity
  - High severity drives inherent design controls first
  - Lower severity may be addressed through protective measures or information for safety

**Key message:** *Strong hazard analysis ensures dFMEA focuses on the right risks & controls*

# 4 tips for optimized hazard analysis



# **1. Anchor hazard analysis to intended use *and* foreseeable misuse**

- **Identify hazards based on real clinical use and environments**
- **Consider foreseeable misuse driven by users, workflow, and operating conditions**



## **2. Define hazards at the use level, *not* the component level**

- **Focus on hazardous situations that can lead to patient harm**
- **Avoid generic, template-driven, or purely component-based hazards**



### **3. Identify hazards across all relevant domains**

- **Hardware, software, and system behavior**
- **Human factors and use related hazards**
- **Cybersecurity hazards when loss of integrity, availability, or control can impact patient safety**

## **4. Establish hazard severity based on potential patient harm**

- **Set severity independent of likelihood or attack probability**
- **Ensure severity reflects worst-case clinical outcome consistent with intended use**

**Key message:** *Hazard analysis defines what must be controlled before selecting controls or performing FMEA*



# Software and cybersecurity are FDA patient safety concerns

## **Most medical devices rely on software and connectivity**

- Software controls core device functionality and clinical logic
- Connectivity expands the operating environment and risk surface

# Software and cybersecurity are FDA patient safety concerns

## **Cybersecurity failures can create hazardous situations**

- Loss of availability can delay or interrupt therapy
- Loss of integrity can result in incorrect or unsafe device behavior

# Software and cybersecurity are FDA patient safety concerns

## FDA treats cybersecurity as a safety issue, not an IT issue

- Cyber risks are evaluated when they can impact patient safety
- Cybersecurity must be addressed through hazard analysis and risk controls

**Key message:** When cybersecurity can affect device behavior or availability, it **must** be managed under ISO 14971

# Integrated software, cybersecurity & usability risks

## Software failures

- Incorrect logic, timing or state handling can lead to hazardous situations

## Cybersecurity vulnerabilities

- Loss of availability, integrity or control can alter device behavior
- Cyber events can trigger or amplify safety hazards

## Use errors

- User interaction, workflow and cognitive load can all contribute to harm
- Poor usability can increase the likelihood or severity of hazardous situations

## Not in isolation!

- Real-world safety events often result from interaction between software, cybersecurity and usability
- FDA evaluates how these risks combine in actual use

# Integrated software, cybersecurity & usability risks

**Key message:** *Effective risk management requires addressing interacting risks, not isolated failure modes*




# Example: FDA view of a connected device hazard

- Multiple contributing causes
  - Software calculation error affects device output
  - Cybersecurity interruption impacts availability or data integrity
  - User misinterprets alarms due to interface or workflow
- FDA evaluates the combined effect
  - Failures interact across software, cybersecurity and usability
  - Individual issues compound rather than occur independently
- Hazardous situation
  - Delayed, incorrect, or missed therapy delivery
- Patient harm risk
  - Potential for serious clinical consequences depending on intended use

**Key message:** *FDA evaluates system-level hazardous situations, not isolated failure modes*



# Residual risk and risk-benefit analysis



## Integrates all residual risks

Considers remaining risks after all reasonable controls are applied

Includes software, cybersecurity, usability, and use-related residual risks



## Documents justified trade-offs

Explains why additional risk reduction is not feasible or would compromise intended use

Demonstrates that risk control decisions were deliberate and evidence-based



## Clinical benefit supports risk acceptability

Weighs residual risk against demonstrated clinical benefit

Supports FDA's determination of reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness

**Key message:** *Benefit-risk analysis is where FDA expects risk management decisions to be explicitly justified*



# What the FDA expects to see

- ✓ Objective evidence supporting risk decisions
  - V&V data demonstrating effectiveness of risk controls
  - Evidence aligned to identified hazards and hazardous situations
- ✓ Traceability across the DHF/MDF
  - Clear linkage from hazards to risk controls to V&V results
  - Consistent traceability across risk files, design inputs, and labeling
- ✓ Consistent intended use across all documents
  - Intended use aligned between risk management, submissions, IFU, and marketing claims
  - No gaps between stated use and analyzed risk
- ✓ Post-market feedback incorporated into risk management
  - Complaints, CAPAs and real-world use data reviewed and assessed
  - Risk analysis updated when new hazards or trends are identified

**Key message:** *The FDA evaluates the consistency of your safety story across the **entire** design and post-market lifecycle*

# Key takeaways



# **1. ISO 14971 supports reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness**

**Risk management underpins the FDA's safety and effectiveness determination**



## **2. Intended use drives FDA risk expectations**

**Intended use defines hazard scope, severity and evidence expectations**

### **3. Integrated risk management is expected**

**Software, cybersecurity, usability and use-related risks must all be addressed together**

## **4. Strong risk management enables efficient FDA review**

**Clear hazard analysis, traceability and justification reduce questions and rework**

# Key message:

*Strong risk management does not slow your FDA review.*

*Weak risk management always does!*

## 4. Continuous ISO 14971 compliance with Qualio





[qualio.com/demo-ci](https://qualio.com/demo-ci)





**Q&A**





**Thank you!**

